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Gift, Greeting, or Gesture: The Khatak and the 
Negotiating of Its Meaning on the Anglo-Tibetan 
Borderlands
The uncertainties of the British Empire came 
to the fore during cultural encounters. When 
material things became a momentary focus 
(especially those entangled in much larger 
diplomatic events), how to negotiate them very 
often resulted in a series of question marks 
in the Foreign Department files. These micro-
narratives of empire, especially those played 
out in the Himalayan borderlands of British 
India reveal a less than omnipotent imperial 
project. 
Following the flight into exile of the thirteenth 
Dalai Lama in February 1910, this paper will 
trace out one tangible way in which the British 
renegotiated their 300 years of accumulated 
diplomatic ‘grammar.’ Using the arrival at state 
level of the khatak (kha btags): a specifically 
Himalayan piece of material culture, we will 
witness the recoding of diplomatic protocols 
made for ceremonials in the plains of India. 
Colonial archives make it possible to gain some 
insight into how the British and their Persian-
derived diplomatic nomenclature attempted to 
make sense and interpret these new material 
encounters and exchanges taking place on the 
edge of imperial influence and understanding. 
As an exchange does of course require both a 
giver and a receiver this paper will also weave 
in khatak-related Tibetan sources, which make 
it clear that this scarf already had multiple 
meanings tied to it and that the Tibetans 
renegotiated their own diplomatic “grammar” 
while exiled from their power base in Lhasa.
Keywords: gift exchange, British India, Tibet, diplomatic 
encounters, objects. 
Emma Martin
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Introduction 
On 22 February 1910, the Viceroy of India, Earl Minto 
(served, 1905-1910) was watching events unfold in the 
eastern Himalayan borderlands of British India with 
a great deal of anxiety. According to Minto, what was       
happening there would have “not only on Nepal, Sik-
kim and Bhutan, but also on Indian opinion...a profound 
effect.” He went on to say of this unprecedented event 
that, “it is also necessary that we should show our bor-
der states that we are not afraid of China.”1 This closely 
followed international incident was the flight into exile of 
the thirteenth Dalai Lama, Tupten Gyatso (thub stan rgya 
mtsho) (1868-1933). He had arrived in Gnatong, Sikkim just 
the day before having fled Lhasa as 2,000 Chinese troops 
advanced on Tibet’s capital, led by the soon-to-be new Chi-
nese amban (resident), Zhong Ying.2 As his escape routes 
had narrowed down, he and his entourage were left with 
little choice but to head for the safety of British India and a 
government whose diplomatic advances he had until then 
resolutely ignored.3 
The Viceroy’s orders that, “it is of first importance to show 
him [the Dalai Lama] high consideration. He is regarded 
with veneration and awe in India,”4 showed he was well 
aware that how the British treated the lama would be care-
fully assessed. Indeed, the colonial anxieties of the Viceroy 
make this seemingly Anglo-Tibetan encounter specifically 
Himalayan. Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal—the Himalayan 
states that had familial, religious, commercial, and po-
litical ties with Lhasa and who were now of course also 
deeply entangled in British India’s colonial rule—would 
be watching.5 How the British chose to make this ‘high 
consideration’ visible had regional ramifications, which if 
judged incorrectly could weaken only recently agreed An-
glo-Himalayan treaties.6 If the British did not gauge their 
treatment of the Dalai Lama and his status correctly, then 
those Himalayan states newly drawn into British India 
diplomatic ‘protection’ and alliances may well have turned 
their attention to China instead.7 This paper will then take 
us to a diplomatic landscape that the British were trying to 
stop from unraveling at its Himalayan edges. 
This was an encounter that took place in multiple bor-
derlands, most obviously diplomatic and geographical 
ones. Yet, just as palpable are the intellectual and cultural 
borderlands: the outer limits of imperial knowledge and 
understanding that separated Himalayan colonial encoun-
ters from those enacted on the Indian plains. For both the 
Tibetans and the British, knowledge about places beyond 
borders was nebulous and fragmentary. As a result, even 
Figure 2. Tupten Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama photographed at 
Hastings House, Calcutta on 16 March 1910. Photographer: Johnston & 
Hoffman. Courtesy of National Museums Liverpool, 1967.183.2.
Figure 1. Elliot, Gilbert John Murray-Kynynmound, Viscount Melgund and 
4th Earl of Minto. Photographed as Governor-General of Canada, 1886-
1904. Courtesy of Library and Archives Canada, MIKAN no. 3426987.
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the smallest gesture offers us the opportunity to witness 
the process of statemaking. As a consequence it is possible 
to trace the strata of colonial knowledge, including how 
opinions and attitudes differed between those stationed in 
the Himalaya and those stationed at Foreign Department 
desks in British India’s imperial cities. Through the discus-
sions and often conflicting opinions of colonial officers – 
individuals who inhabited very different colonial worlds – 
we see the minutiae of statemaking. Clear tensions emerge 
within government memos in establishing just how high 
this consideration for the Dalai Lama would actually be. 
Would he be understood as the head of a Himalayan state, 
a religious figurehead or something else? While those 
officers who operated in Himalayan networks pressed for 
the highest diplomatic honors their persuasive arguments 
came under considerable pressure from other officers who 
understood very little about the politics of state in the 
Himalaya. 
 The question of greatest concern in this article is not 
simply tied to the uncertainties of state making, but more 
pointedly to how this ‘high consideration’ materialized. 
Anglo-Himalayan diplomacy has increasingly become a 
topic of conversation for scholars interested in the modern 
geo-politics of Tibet and its neighbors.8 Yet, much less has 
been said about a crucial component of these diplomatic 
meetings: the objects that punctuated these events and 
especially those exchanged between heads of state and 
recognized rulers (see Martin 2014 and 2015 as exceptions 
to this scholarly trend). While the gifts that accompanied 
these diplomatic meetings are occasionally and cursorily 
mentioned in political narratives, they have much to tell 
us about how each party imagined and positioned the oth-
er in relation to their own imagined status. 
Such objects also represent what I call ‘material knowl-
edge,’ a facet of colonial knowledge that has received 
little consideration despite the intense focus on imperial 
forms of knowledge making in recent years.9 To give this 
concept a definition we should think about it as a type of 
knowledge that could be constructed about others from 
material things. This is not simply knowledge accrued by 
looking alone, but from touching, performing, valuing, and 
displaying material things, which could lead to the seeking 
out and eventual incorporating of local (in this case Hima-
layan) connoisseurial scholarship into colonial archives. 
Material knowledge, like many other forms of knowledge 
borne of cultural contact, had a ‘fuzzy logic’ as it, “never 
follows a preconceived script but is always unpredictable 
and messy” (Mackenthun and Juterczenka 2009: 10). It was 
often informed by prior ‘culture contact’ (Campbell 2003), 
wherein ways of doing things in one culture is reconfig-
ured and made anew for another in order to control and 
make safe volatile and unforeseen encounters. While 
gift-giving was often viewed as a diplomatic nuisance by 
Secretaries of State and Foreign Department officials, the 
objects presented on these occasions were critical to the 
political process. They were regularly mined for informa-
tion, with knowledge made from and projected onto things 
as they circulated between parties. As Patricia Berger notes 
in her nuanced reading of the Qing emperor Qianlong’s gift 
exchanges, gifts, and material things per se were, “multi-
vocal in the messages they sent, presenting a long menu 
of possible positive [EM: and I would also add negative or 
anxious] readings” (Berger 2003: 41). 
To this end, I argue that by following things – in this case 
white scarves – and the gestures tied to them, we have 
the opportunity to read beyond the more obvious political 
narratives found in the colonial archive. By focusing on the 
choices made following the arrival at state level of a par-
ticularly Tibetan piece of material culture, the khatak (kha 
btags) or white ceremonial scarf, it is possible to conceive 
of a more balanced understanding of the shifting power 
dynamics at play, especially when the sites of encounter 
move between British India and Tibet. By highlighting the 
gestures, terminology, and hierarchies stitched into the 
khatak by the British India government and the Dalai Lama, 
we see that both parties played with its meaning. Para-
phrasing Lorraine Daston, the khatak could indeed ‘talk’ 
(Daston 2004), but both the British and the Tibetans had on 
occasion selective listening, which becomes apparent as 
we attune ourselves to the registers they chose to hear and 
those they chose to brush under the ceremonial carpet. 
As the title of this article suggests, I read these encounters 
against the political grain, instead watching over the first 
meetings between the Viceroy of India and his Tibetan 
counterpart, the Dalai Lama, using a sharply focused 
material lens. What will become clear is that these diplo-
matic encounters and their negotiating—played out more 
than a century ago—are still strikingly pertinent today. 
The “grammar” (Michael 2003: 83) hurriedly constructed 
for this unforeseen event would in fact establish a set of 
ground rules for future global powers and their interac-
tions with Tibet that are still evident today. 
The Khatak and its Transcultural Meanings 
As the British watched nervously from their administrative 
positions the first khatak in this burgeoning Anglo-Tibetan 
relationship arrived three weeks before the Dalai Lama, on 
3 February, 1910 in Calcutta. This khatak was accompanied 
by an urgent verbal message sent by the Dalai Lama to 
Viceroy Minto, regarding the escalating situation in Lhasa. 
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Yet, the khatak, meant to be read as an authenticator of the 
message with which it traveled, was seemingly unintelli-
gible to Spencer Harcourt Butler (1869-1938), the Foreign 
Department Secretary of State for British India, who was 
thoroughly bemused by this scarf. Having received the 
khatak from the Dalai Lama’s messengers he wrote in dis-
patches, “I asked if they had any letter from the Dalai Lama 
to the Viceroy. They said they had not, that the scarf was 
sufficient according to their custom.”10 This was clearly 
outside the cultural comfort zone of a Secretary of State 
who oversaw a department whose note-taking was later 
described as an “intellectual tours de force” (Dewey 1993: 
6). With a hint of desperation Butler asked, “Please look up 
papers and see what was done in previous communications 
between the Dalai Lama or Tashi [Panchen] Lama and Vice-
roy. [sic] and note anything that we have about Tibetan 
etiquette.”11
Butler seems to have had a rather severe case of imperial 
amnesia when it came to the khatak, for it had already 
played a significant part in making material contact be-
tween the British in India and Tibet. Its origins can in fact 
be traced out to The East India Company’s first contact 
with Tibet in 1774. This was the year that Warren Hastings 
(1732-1818), then Governor-General of Bengal received 
a letter and gifts from the sixth Panchen Lama, Lozang 
Pelden Yéshé (blo bzang dpal ldan ye shes) (1738-80) asking 
for assistance with the Bhutan-Cooch Behar conflict. When 
Puhrangir and Paima, two Himalayan gosain12 (a mendicant 
Hindu) and agents of the Panchen Lama, delivered the 
request for assistance in Calcutta Hastings made sure not 
to simply take note of what was written in the lama’s let-
ter, but to also make a close reading of the gifts. As Bishop 
shows, they did indeed speak to him:
Gilded Russian leather stamped with the Czar’s 
double-headed eagle, and Chinese silk, which sug-
gested external commerce; small ingots of gold and 
silver, purses of gold dust, and bags of musk, which 
seemed evidence of internal wealth; and Tibetan 
wool cloth, which together with the well-made 
chests in which the gifts had come, indicated a 
knowledge of arts and industries (Bishop 1989: 29)
In his seminal work The Myth of Shangri-La, Bishop under-
stood the latent potential in things and that they contrib-
uted to complex processes of knowledge gathering, which 
in this case showed itself in pre-colonial Anglo-Himalayan 
relations. As Hastings ran his fingers over the luxury 
commodities in the traveling chests, Bishop concluded that 
the gifts “activated ancient rumors and vague fragments of 
knowledge that had been steadily accumulating over the 
centuries” (Bishop Ibid). These objects of desire not only 
alerted Hastings to potentially lucrative trans-Himalayan 
trading relations, but they also indicated to him that the 
Panchen Lama was a potential regional leader who could 
make his commercial ambitions in the Himalaya a reality. 
George Bogle (1746-81), the twenty-seven-year-old private 
secretary to Hastings was chosen as the Governor’s ambas-
sador. He visited Bhutan before making his way to Tashi 
Figure 3. ‘The Teshu Lama (d 1780) 
Giving Audience’, attributed to Tilly 
Kettle, c.1775. Likely commissioned 
by Warren Hastings and gifted 
to King George III. RCIN 407227. 
Courtesy of Royal Collections © 
HM Queen Elizabeth II 2014.
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Lhunpo monastery near Shigatse to meet the Panchen 
Lama. This mission was later immortalized in a fabulous, 
if somewhat flawed painting now in The Royal Collection, 
seemingly commissioned by Hastings from one of the art-
ists he favored in India, Tilly Kettle (1735-86). The moment 
chosen to represent this new relationship was Bogle and 
the Panchen Lama’s first moment of material contact—the 
exchange of the khatak. 
Before glancing over the meanings worked into this paint-
ing we should first briefly pause on the khatak itself. There 
are a number of contemporary Tibetan writings on the 
khatak that provide a cultural framework for understand-
ing this piece of Tibetan material.13 Two publications in 
particular discuss the khatak in its historical and contem-
porary context and make reference to the loss of the nu-
anced meanings that were once ascribed to it, particularly 
in pre-1959 Ü or central Tibet (dbus). The first, a eulogy to 
the khatak was originally published in 1989 and again as a 
letter sent to the author in 2013 from Rakra Rinpoche (rag 
ra rin po che) (1925-2012), the Tibetan scholar, artist, and 
poet who had studied with Gendün Chöpel (dge ’dan chos 
’phel). He not only praised the scarf’s many qualities, but 
he also lamented its now ubiquitous and uncritical use 
in the late twentieth century (rdo rje dbang phyug 2013: 
339-41). The second, a 1997 publication from the Library 
of Tibetan Works and Archives on the customs and rituals 
relating to the khatak was compiled by Lobsang Dönden for 
the Library’s oral history series based on interviews with 
Tibetans who had served as lay officials in pre-1959 Tibet 
(Blo bzang don ldan 1997).14 
In simple terms the khatak is a white scarf. Its use, be-
lieved to originate in Mongolia, now stretches across many 
Himalayan communities who have strong ties with Tibet 
and its culture. These cultural synergies make the scarf a 
common sight not only in Tibet, but also in Ladakh, Nepal, 
Bhutan, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh 
and at Buddhist sites in plains India. Lobsang Dönden, in 
his preliminary description, notes that the khatak “forms 
an indispensable practice that binds two sides into a 
cordial relationship in all important secular and religious 
events, festivals, and ceremonies” (Blo bzang don ldan 
1997: 11).15 This is an idea we will return to. Furthermore, 
the khatak can also be found in a diverse range of offering 
contexts, from being given to lamas and guests on arrival 
and departure, to serving as letter wraps or, as we have 
already seen, as message authenticators. The khatak is 
also offered at significant religious and pilgrimage sites, 
at river confluences, the summit of high passes, and even 
as a catapult, used to throw gifts of money to performers. 
Rakra Rinpoche also alerts us to the potential Tibetan ma-
terial hierarchies of the khatak and the fact that the fabric, 
weave, and length of the khatak constituted a complex 
matrix of material knowledge. “As regarding the types of 
Khatak, there are three: nangzö (nang mdzod), ashi (a she), 
possibly a Mongolian term, and zubshi (zub shi). Nangzö 
were reserved for important occasions, appointment of 
Kalons, and enthronement of high Lamas; ashi was used 
in common festivities, and zubshi is given to those of the 
lower class” (rdo rje dbang phyug 2013: 341).16 Starting in 
reverse order, the zubshi, is an open weave, mesh-like scarf 
used for less important occasions and ordinary events, but 
Figure 4. zub-shi khatak – a 
simple open weave khatak that is 
extremely rare today.
(Emma Martin, 2015)
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also when working people give offerings representing the 
three-fold mandala of body, speech, and mind. The silk ashi 
is used on important occasions, its defining feature being 
a single layer of tassels. This is the scarf most commonly 
used today. Finally, the premium scarf, the nangdzö, is wo-
ven in a similar way to the ashi, but is often much longer in 
length and with a woven piece within the tassels to create 
two ‘layers’ (Blo bzang don ldan 1997). While this was a 
scarf specifically used during festivals, the nangdzö would 
also become enmeshed in the diplomatic relations between 
Tibet and British India. 
If we take a closer look at Kettle’s painting with these 
khatak meanings in mind, the material hierarchy of this 
gesture is missing – we cannot see the single or double lay-
er of tassels here. But there were other British markers of 
hierarchy on show. We see Bogle—dressed in a Bhutanese 
robe that is then draped with a status enhancing Roman 
toga-like cloth—standing at the far left of the painting, 
while a man dressed in Tibetanesque clothing steps for-
ward to offer the khatak. The Panchen Lama, wearing a 
fur-lined riding hat, sits reaching out with just one hand to 
take the offered scarf. The actions, the etiquette, and the 
Figure 5. a-shi khatak – a silk 
khatak with a single layer of 
tassels.
(Emma Martin, 2015)
Figure 6. nang-dzö khatak – a long 
wide silk khatak with a double 
layer of tassels. 
(Emma Martin, 2015)
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materiality of the scene is “muddled” (Teltscher 2006: 176). 
The painting seems to be an amalgam of several meetings 
between the two men that only in part matches the ac-
count of their first meeting on 8 November 1774. 
The Lama was upon his throne, formed of wood, 
carved and gilt, with some cushions above it, upon 
which he sat cross-legged...I laid the Governor’s 
presents before him, delivering the letter and pearl 
necklace into his own hands, together with a white 
Pelong handkerchief on my own part, according to 
the custom of the country...The Lama...threw white 
Pelong handkerchiefs over our necks at retiring. 
(Bogle in Markham 1876: 83)
This ‘muddling’ is something that Kate Teltscher in her 
evocative account of Bogle’s expedition to Tibet presumes 
is a result of the reconstruction of this scene in the artist’s 
studio, seemingly staged by Bogle himself after his return 
to Calcutta. She wonders if Bogle had reimagined this 
moment as, “perhaps the stooping posture of presentation 
was considered inappropriate for Bogle...The upright Bogle 
retains his dignity” (Teltscher 2006: Ibid). Yet, there is also 
the possibility of reading this gesture as one that despite 
the perceived correcting of prestige by Kettle and Bogle, 
still manages to muddle what it means to offer and receive 
a khatak. 
In her own reading of this painting, Teltscher makes us 
acutely aware of the significance of the performative 
act; the gestures and specific events that the khatak was 
incorporated into. In this painting we are guided by its 
British agents (its sitter, painter, and patron) to read a 
series of hierarchical encodings that seemingly enhance 
British prestige and power, but this is all rather lop-sided. 
If we look again, factoring in Tibetan understandings of 
the theatricalities at play whilst using the khatak-related 
writings of Rakra Rinpoche and the compilations made by 
Lobsang Dönden as reference points, it is possible to sketch 
in unintended (from Bogle’s perspective) Tibetan layers of 
meaning. 
Rakra Rinpoche was acutely aware that both temporal and 
cultural distances had led to a repurposing of the khatak in 
the late 20th and early 21st century. He lamented the fact 
that the Tibet-specific hierarchical gestures of offering 
the khatak had become highly volatile as the khatak and 
its meanings and gestures became mobile as it moved into 
exile. As a result the practice of placing the scarf around 
the receiver’s neck had become common practice. “These 
days it has however become fashion to tie Khataks around 
people’s neck and hence we see brides and grooms almost 
asphyxiated by the loads of Khataks that weigh around 
their neck, which is ridiculous” (rdo rje dbang phyug 2013: 
Ibid).17 The fluctuating meaning of the scarf when per-
formed in different geographical contexts, was something 
that the British officers stationed in the Himalaya also 
recognized. Charles Bell (1870-1945), the Political Officer 
in Sikkim, who we will meet again shortly, would make a 
point of noting the cultural subtleties between the Indian 
and Tibetan practice of garlanding in his second volume on 
Tibetan culture, The People of Tibet published in 1928.
Among the peoples of India it is an exceptional 
honour to receive a garland round the neck, but the 
same rule does not apply to the ka-ta of Tibet. And 
thus the foreigner from India has sometimes been 
misled, not understanding that, when a ka-ta was 
placed round his neck, he was being marked with a 
status of inferiority (Bell 1928: 250). 
Rakra Rinpoche having emphasized this smoothing out 
of Tibetan customs in exile then looked to replace its 
contours using his own knowledge of khatak practice in 
pre-1959 Tibet.
The etiquette for offering requires a person to 
present Khataks in the hands of parents and Lamas 
if they’re standing or to place them on the table if 
they are seated. Younger siblings placed Khataks 
in the hands of the older siblings, and parents did 
the same to their sons. As a sign of respect, friends 
exchanged Khataks by handing them instead of 
tying them around each other’s neck (rdo rje dbang 
phyug 2013: Ibid).18
We see this practice quite clearly in Bogle’s written ac-
count of his first meeting with the Panchen Lama. Bogle, 
in receiving the khatak around his neck, is undoubtedly the 
subordinate during their meeting. However, if we return 
to Kettle’s painting—the visual and public colonial record 
of this meeting—we see that the performance has changed. 
Here, an intermediary offers the khatak, yet still this British 
correction is by no means perfect. If we turn to the com-
pendium provided by Lobsang Dönden that again refer-
ences pre-1959 practice and especially if we scan the Lhasa 
New Year ceremonies for officials, these oral testimonies 
offer a strict ordering of khatak presentation. It is clear 
that civil officials and foreign diplomats neither placed 
their khatak on the Dalai Lama’s table nor into his casually 
offered hands. This moment of material contact was, as 
in Kettle’s painting, completed by an intermediary, as no 
civil official had the privilege or the right to approach him 
directly with a khatak.
Clearly, Tilly Kettle’s painting is an imperfect act of 
remembrance and artistic translation. But nevertheless, 
as Natasha Eaton (2013) notes, the representation of 
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cross-cultural encounters was a popular and powerful 
device in the emerging empires of the eighteenth cen-
tury, marking those represented—in this case Bogle, but 
by extension Hastings – as agents in the embryonic act of 
empire building. The khatak, in this British context, already 
signaled the beginning of a ruler-to-ruler relationship. 
In the depiction of its offering, it visualized those whom 
the British had chosen to be their would-be Himalayan 
counterparts. Despite the temporal distance between Lob-
sang Dönden and Rakra Rinpoche’s understanding of the 
khatak and this painting, in retrospect it is possible to think 
through this scene with Tibetan khatak etiquette in mind. 
We do not necessarily see a dignified, aloof ambassador 
of a soon to be imperial power, but instead see a portray-
al of another powerful ruler: the Panchen Lama. Despite 
positioning Bogle at the edges of this painting, Kettle still 
shows the British to be subordinate in this moment of con-
tact. In her reading of this painting and the likely process-
es of its creation Teltscher concludes that, “the painting 
commemorates a moment of cultural accommodation” 
(Teltscher 2006: 176). Yet as we leave this painting behind 
and return to 1910, it is obvious that rather than benignly 
smoothing over tensions during cultural encounters, ma-
terial things were just as likely to make cultural fault lines 
acutely visible.
Making Hierarchies: Gun Shots and Silk Scarves
Kettle’s conversation piece, painted some 135 years before 
the event we are concerned with here, aimed to suggest 
that the British knew and could thereby control such 
diplomatic meetings and their associated material culture. 
Nevertheless, if we return to the reception given to the 
khatak by the bemused Butler in February 1910, we see it 
was actually causing a great deal of concern. After But-
ler’s cries to “note anything that we have about Tibetan 
etiquette,” reverberated down the corridors of the Foreign 
Department, Butler then composed himself, deciding that 
this ethereal message wrapped in a scarf gave the British 
India government a little breathing space. The Tibetan 
officials may have delivered a khatak from the Dalai Lama, 
but the British refused to recognize it as an official channel 
of communication, leaving this diplomatic agent and its 
two intermediaries without an audience with the Viceroy. 
Butler further cemented his intentions by adding that, “we 
should not enter into any written communication with the 
Dalai Lama about the relations between the Tibetans and 
Chinese until he first addresses us in writing.”19 However, 
these deferring tactics would no longer work once the 
Dalai Lama arrived in British India. On 24 February, the day 
the Dalai Lama reached Pedong in Sikkim, Butler reminded 
the Foreign Department staff in a somewhat prophetically 
worded statement that, “we are face to face now with a 
real North-Eastern Frontier question and the moment has 
come to formulate a policy. His Majesty’s Secretary of State 
will probably move now that the matter is hot. If we can-
not settle things now we are not likely to be able to settle 
them hereafter.”20
While the British tracked the Dalai Lama’s escape from 
Lhasa, the Foreign Department had already begun to make 
preparations for his arrival. The officials must have been 
circumspect, as just a few short years before the British 
Indian government had targeted the ninth Panchen Lama, 
Tupten Chökyi Nyima (thub bstan chos kyi nyi ma) (1883-
1937) as a potential leader in Tibet, someone they could 
conduct trade and diplomatic relations with.21 With this 
new arrival and the potential for new diplomatic encoun-
ters, the Dalai Lama and his reception had to be carefully 
arranged. There was though a clear difference of opinion 
between colonial officers as to how this moment should be 
articulated. On 22 February, the day after the Dalai Lama 
set foot on British Indian soil, Butler sent word to, “in-
struct the local authorities to show His Holiness every per-
sonal courtesy” but tellingly, “the visit should be regarded 
as private.”22 This labeling gave an early indication of how 
British India would establish a road map for the types of 
actions and gestures that were to follow. It is at this stage 
that we begin to see how the British manufactured their 
contact with the Dalai Lama and how the process of show-
ing British civility, whilst keeping him politically at arm’s 
length manifested itself. Despite the categorizing of the 
Dalai Lama’s visit as private, there were clearly many offi-
cial features here, which could have been easily misread by 
the Tibetan delegation, especially since they would have 
no knowledge of this British classification. The most obvi-
ous example was that the Dalai Lama and his eighty-strong 
entourage were to be hosted at Hastings House in Calcutta. 
Hastings House, a grand residence of the British Indian 
government, was used by the Viceroy to entertain foreign 
heads of states and India’s Princely State rulers. In the days 
prior to the Dalai Lama’s arrival preparations were made 
and discussions were had relating to the etiquette that 
would imbue this so-called private visit. Along with the 
purchase of saffron bed linen for the Dalai Lama’s quar-
ters,23 questions were raised over the tangible and intan-
gible markers of state business that despite its ‘private’ 
labeling would welcome the lama to Calcutta. 
In order to put the discussions regarding the khatak into 
some kind of wider ceremonial context, it is useful at 
this juncture to take note of the most audible of these 
ceremonial markers—a military gun salute.24 The British 
India gun salute was a highly structured instrument 
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of hierarchy, which, along with titles and decorations, 
articulated a ranking, imposed by the British, on the 
Indian Princely State rulers and foreign dignitaries (see 
Cannadine 2001). The gun salute made audible just how 
significant the British considered any given ruler to be, 
with salutes ranging from the lowest at eleven to the 
highest at twenty-one. The question for the British was, 
just how many gun salutes should the Dalai Lama receive? 
The files that Butler had called for, but which offered very 
little in the way of determining what he should do with 
the recently arrived khatak did give up details of precedent 
when it came to the question of gun salutes. The Panchen 
Lama during his visit to the Viceroy in 1906, Butler noted, 
had received seventeen salutes as he entered Hastings 
House. Then, the British understood the Panchen Lama’s 
powers as a ruler to equate to those of other ‘third tier’ 
Princely State rulers, including Bikaner, Cochin (now 
Kochi, Kerala), and Jaipur (Coen 1971: 262). While the 
Panchen Lama’s status was deemed lower than powerful 
states such as Baroda, Gwalior, and Jammu-Kashmir, his 
place in the hierarchy of Himalayan heads of state was 
unrivalled. Bhutan and Sikkim would be his nearest chal-
Figure 7. The Tibetan exiles in 
Hastings House, Calcutta, March 
1910. Photographer: Th.Parr / 
Burlington Smith. Courtesy of 
Private Collection.
Figure 8. Postcard of Hastings 
House. Early 20th century. 
Photographer: Johnston & 
Hoffman. Collection of Emma 
Martin.
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lengers when awarded fifteen salutes respectively in 1911 
at the Delhi Durbar (Martin 2012: 10), while Cooch-Behar 
would be invested with a more modest thirteen salutes. 
However, for a new group of Himalayan officers who had 
not been directly connected with the promotion of the 
Panchen Lama as the British India government’s preferred 
Tibetan figurehead, this was not going to be enough for the 
arrival of the Dalai Lama. 
Charles Bell, the Political Officer for Sikkim, Bhutan, and 
Tibet would become well known for the relationship he 
would cultivate with the Dalai Lama in 1910 along with the 
many books—including a biography of the Dalai Lama—he 
would write on Tibetan culture. Bell was himself a cultural 
intermediary of sorts: a British officer firmly rooted in a 
colonial ideology, but whose ways of thinking were sliced 
through with Himalayan and Tibetan ways of conceptual-
izing the world. Bell would describe himself on his return 
from Lhasa in 1921 as, “in large measure Tibetanised,” (Bell 
[1946 1987: 29) and while this statement might be stretch-
ing his depth of understanding somewhat, his experiences 
and knowledge did make Bell Britain’s ‘Man on the Spot.’ 
It is Bell’s starting position on the subject of gun salutes 
for the Dalai Lama that opens up the differences—what 
I called earlier the strata—visible in colonial knowledge. 
We see here that colonial worldviews rub up against each 
other, especially when conversations occurred between 
desk-bound officers in the metropoles of empire and those 
based in the borderlands. Butler having noted this Panchen 
Lama precedent suggested the idea of seventeen-gun-sa-
lutes to Bell, but Bell had other ideas. Bell wanted twenty-
one-gun salutes—the highest salute—for the Dalai Lama. 
Bell couched his counter-argument in terms of the lama’s 
superior status as a religious authority. For Bell, he was 
someone who was, “worshipped as a deity by 10 or 12 
million Buddhists and is venerated by at least a hundred 
million more.”25 Bell, portrayed the Dalai Lama not simply 
as a leader of a nation state, a position which might make 
the Foreign Department more than a little nervous, but as 
someone who had influence and power that could not be 
contained by national borders. But Butler’s predisposition 
for maintaining colonial order, which manifested itself in 
the colonial fuzzy logic known as precedent, was not so 
easily swayed by Bell’s religious rethinking of the Dalai 
Lama’s powerbase. Interestingly, Butler chose to factor in 
a further, new, but still today enduring perception of the 
Dalai Lama that would temper any powers that Bell might 
plead for. “Mr Bell thinks that His Holiness should get 21 
guns...The Tashi [Panchen] Lama got 17 guns. As he was 
our friend and the Dalai Lama was not and is a refugee I 
think 19 guns is enough” (author emphasis).26 
Bell’s was a decidedly Himalayan view. By 1910 he had 
spent a decade working in the Himalayan borderlands and 
was someone who understood religious power to be as, if 
not more, potent than any possible British India decora-
tion or title could be. However, Butler from his Foreign 
Department desk was not willing to be swayed entirely by 
Himalayan sensibilities and instead of viewing the Dalai 
Lama as someone whose religious authority made him an 
unequalled power, Butler would read the lama as a refu-
gee, someone who had lost something of his potency the 
moment he stepped on British Indian soil. Furthermore, 
while the British with one eye on the Himalayan reading 
of their treatment of the Dalai Lama wanted to express a 
heightened sense of civility, the lama had sought asylum 
here—he had not been invited to India. This unanticipated 
arrival may have given men like Bell unforeseen oppor-
tunities to forge links with a man who had refused to deal 
with the British prior to his arrival. However, for Butler 
the lama’s appearance would cause the British a constant 
diplomatic headache and this had to be factored into the 
honors shown him. This wider perspective meant that 
Butler would not countenance twenty-one-gun salutes for 
the Dalai Lama, but there was a meeting in the middle: the 
lama would receive nineteen.
This bartering for state honors would continue when 
Butler again turned to Bell, this time on the subject of the 
khatak. On 12 March, two days before the meeting with 
the Viceroy at Hastings House, Butler realized that he had 
yet to settle the issue of what to do with the khatak and so 
again Bell was sought out for advice. Bell instructed Butler 
that, “the Viceroy/Foreign Secretary should rise and pres-
ent a scarf to the Dalai Lama, who will rise to receive it.”27 
If we think back to the misplaced choreography sketched 
into the khatak exchange between Bogle and the Panchen 
Lama and the pre-1959 Tibetan readings of the scarf as 
recorded by Rakra Rinpoche and Lobsang Dönden, the 
gesture suggested by Bell would be read by the Dalai Lama 
and other Tibetan witnesses as an acceptable exchange. 
Perhaps due to gaps in colonial knowledge, this approach 
seemed at first to be agreeable to those in the Foreign 
Department and the Viceroy’s inner circle. However, a 
demi-official letter of the same day reveals that Butler was 
about to be swayed by the fuzzy logic of men who had no 
connection whatsoever to the Himalaya. In their discus-
sions we see the potential for a triple translation and colo-
nial recoding of the khatak and it becomes clear that those 
in Calcutta found it impossible to think in a ‘Tibetanised’ 
way and instead sought their answers from the courtly 
Persian terminology of the Princely States of plains India. 
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Soon after his conversation with Bell, Butler consulted 
his Under Secretary Arthur Roylance Jelf (1875- d. before 
1941), who had in turn been discussing the khatak ex-
change with Alexander Fleetwood Pinhey (1861-1916), the 
Viceroy’s Private Secretary. While Jelf and Pinhey were 
career colonial administrators who had spent several years 
respectively in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier, 
they had little knowledge of the Himalayan world. Yet, the 
small matter of lived experience would not stop Jelf, using 
Pinhey’s musings, from advising Butler on what should be 
done with the fast approaching khatak exchange.
The full Tibetan custom would be for the Dalai 
Lama to present a scarf to the Viceroy on arriving 
at Government House and receiving a scarf from 
the Viceroy on leaving; and vice versa at Hastings 
House. But in the case of the Tashi [Panchen] Lama 
the Viceroy gave no scarf. Mr. Bell thinks a scarf 
should be given at the return visit. It should be 
given by Foreign Secretary to mark the rank of the 
Viceroy. They did not make much of the Dalai Lama 
at Peking and in such matters we should be careful 
of going too far.’28 
In the space of just a few hours the Dalai Lama’s status—
performed using British India khatak choreography—had 
gone from one of high prestige, where material contact 
would be made between equals, to the complete dismiss-
al of the lama. Jelf was here suggesting that the Viceroy 
should not engage with the Dalai Lama at all. The Viceroy 
would not offer a khatak during their initial meeting and 
the equally crucial return visit would not be made by the 
Viceroy, but by his subordinate, Foreign Secretary Butler. 
Here, we are privy to the proposed transformation of the 
khatak into a British tool of hierarchical designation, en-
abling rank and standing to be tacitly communicated to the 
Tibetans, just in case the significance of the nineteen-gun 
salute as opposed to the Viceroy’s forty-one gun salute 
was not enough. This common, but nevertheless complex 
offering was about to be unraveled with new British India 
meanings woven into it, making a nuanced reading by 
the Dalai Lama a messy and confusing undertaking. There 
were clear hierarchical implications in this reworking; if 
this was not the case then there would be no obvious need 
to alter the established practice as suggested by Bell. The 
British in their actions were then hoping to make visible 
their hesitations over how they would quantify their fu-
ture relationship with the Lhasa government. 
 We might consider these British India government af-
fronts to be expected, but what is rather interesting here 
is that Jelf and Pinhey were not building this ceremonial 
picture simply by positioning the Dalai Lama vis à vis the 
Viceroy. This new diplomatic construction had in fact been 
determined by what they understood the khatak to be. It 
appears that something had simply been lost in translation 
when both men carried out their colonial classification of 
the khatak. In establishing what the khatak was they had 
relied on a fixed inventory of equivalent Persian terms; a 
practice commonly applied to ceremonial etiquette and 
its construction by British Residents based in the Princely 
States. In doing so they had quantified the khatak as a naẕr, 
the Persian term for a tribute or gift of money, in short 
a tangible, financial thing. In Jelf and Pinhey’s Persian 
reading of this encounter it would be impossible for the 
Viceroy to step forward and present the Dalai Lama with a 
naẕr. This would be understood by the British as a subordi-
nate act and one that would surely damage the Viceroy’s 
prestige, especially, as Jelf and Pinhey suggested in their 
deliberations, in the eyes of China.29 While Jelf and Pinhey 
did not implicitly refer to a Himalayan presence, they were 
also well aware that Himalayan states would watch over 
this event intently; Sidkeong Tulku (1879-1914) was part 
of the Dalai Lama’s extended entourage, attending as the 
British India approved heir to the Sikkim gadi (throne).30 In 
this context, neither man believed there could possibly be 
an exchange of khatak as proposed. 
But Bell was not about to allow imperial ignorance jeop-
ardize any chance he had of building closer diplomatic 
relations with Tibet. Having seen the hurriedly dispatched 
memo on this conversation he was quick to step in firing 
back a note that made it clear that this exchange was, “an 
act of common courtesy which can hardly be omitted and 
in no way resembles a nazar.”31 Using his Himalayan per-
spective he was clearly alarmed that both the Dalai Lama 
and Sidkeong Tulku would interpret this as an arrogant 
and dismissive act and therefore he asked for the khatak 
and its colonial classification to be realigned. The Foreign 
Department as a result would reclassify the offering of the 
khatak with yet another Persian term, this time mizaaj pursi 
(the wishing of health ceremony), and would in subse-
quent memos and reports refer to the exchange of scarves 
as such. 
This movement of the meaning rather than the gesture 
itself would allow a compromised khatak exchange to take 
place.32 The British had instantly read the khatak as a mate-
rial thing, hence their assumption that the khatak should 
be classified as a naẕr. Jelf and Pinhey found it difficult to 
think of the scarf as a sign of something else: a sentiment, 
an offering of sincerity, something that acts as a precur-
sor to the exchanges both vocal and material that were 
to follow. Butler had already grasped these dynamics and 
used them to his own advantage. They instead had chosen 
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to read it solely through its material value—as a tangible 
thing—a gift, loaded with issues of reciprocity. The clas-
sifying of the khatak as mizaaj pursi suited the British: not 
only did it sidestep any issues of reciprocity, but the term 
and its associated meanings were not seen to be binding, 
unlike the giving of a naẕr, which implied a material bind-
ing together of the actors involved. The mizaaj pursi was 
regarded as a simple salutation, a lesser, non-binding offer-
ing.33 The British had from their perspective successfully 
repurposed the khatak to their own advantage. 
But, what of the Tibetans? The colonial archive as we 
might expect does not provide both sides of this exchange 
story.34 Furthermore, I have been frustrated by the lack of 
detail recorded in the biography of the thirteenth Dalai 
Lama, which offers a poor record of his visit to Calcutta.35 
Despite this, the inclusion of the wording in the fleeting 
Tibetan account of a week in Calcutta may suggest that 
the lama knew or had been instructed by the British as to 
what his newly conceived status and the offering of the 
khatak would now mean. The biography records that, “he 
traveled to the place, currently known to the people as Cal-
cutta, where he met and exchanged greetings with Mulula 
[Minto], the British Regent.”36 It is tempting to grasp on to 
this speck of Tibetan insight, but it is also rather difficult 
from this to analyze the complexity of gestures and their 
meanings with any certainty. Therefore, by returning to 
the material in the archival record and by following the 
khatak back to Tibet it is clear that the Tibetans had been 
acutely aware of their exile status and that they had in fact 
reworked their own nuanced khatak culture in order to 
flatter and gain favor from the British.
The Khatak Back in Tibet
The British had grown use to receiving the highest khatak 
honors from the Tibetans, while on British Indian soil. 
David Macdonald (1870-1962), the Scottish-Sikkim Brit-
ish Trade Agent stationed at Yatung in Dromo (dro mo) or 
Chumbi Valley, received the Dalai Lama as he went on the 
run from Lhasa in February 1910 (Macdonald (1932) 2005: 
65). Macdonald having requested asylum for the lama was 
allowed to offer him overnight assistance and as the Dalai 
Lama entered the Trade Agency, Macdonald recalled much 
later that, “he offered me a very large silk scarf, called 
nagdzo, and shook my hand” (Macdonald (1932) 2005: 65). 
The additional gesture—the handshake—tells us that the 
Dalai Lama was already renegotiating the tightly choreo-
graphed meanings of the khatak and reworking them for 
these unexpected and fraught encounters with British of-
ficers. There is no wonder that Macdonald vividly recalled 
this material encounter in his memoirs as the giving of a 
nangdzö khatak—meant for the highest echelons of Tibetan 
society—by a religious leader into the hands of a junior lay 
official would have been unprecedented.37 Desperate times 
called for desperate measures and the Dalai Lama—unlike 
the British—was not willing to take the risk that he might 
offend Macdonald (and by extension the British) by not 
personally giving a scarf. 
This first piece of khatak contact would define the Dalai 
Lama’s ceremonial practices in exile. He would apply this 
same exaggerated, flattering gesture many times in British 
India and with many relatively junior officers, amongst 
others Charles Bell, who of his first meeting with the lama 
in Darjeeling recalled:
Over my wrist he placed a gorgeous white silk 
scarf, and I one over his, the best I had been able to 
procure. For this is the recognized Tibetan form of 
greeting, and by placing the scarf, as he did, over 
my wrists, instead of round my neck, the Incarna-
tion of Buddha disclaimed all superiority of rank 
(Bell 1987 [1946]: 104).38 
The Dalai Lama, new to British India and its hierarchies, 
circumspectly negotiated his own actions and expectations 
accordingly. He knew, like the British did, that he was now 
in a vulnerable position and therefore must temper his 
actions. His gestures and his decisions as to which khatak 
to offer were those of a man who had left his homeland 
with nothing and now needed the support of an influential 
empire, and if this involved a certain amount of flattery to 
those men who could help him garner support, then these 
were the steps he would take. It would be another ten 
years before the British would come to the realization that 
the Dalai Lama had also recoded the khatak whilst in unfa-
miliar territory from 1910 to 1912. Bell, having come out of 
retirement to head a mission to Lhasa in 1920 to 1921, and 
as the first European to receive a personal invitation from 
the Dalai Lama, may have expected that he would be treat-
ed to similar khatak honors as to those he had received in 
Darjeeling and Calcutta. However, now firmly established 
as temporal ruler of central Tibet,39 things were very dif-
ferent when the British came to call on the Dalai Lama. 
Bell would witness one of the most spectacular khatak 
related ceremonials in the Tibetan calendar when he was 
invited to the Gyelpo Losar or King’s New Year (rgyal po lo 
gsar) in 1921. The first two days of losar (New Year) allowed 
the lay officials of Lhasa, central Tibet, and the foreign 
dignitaries residing in Lhasa to receive their audience with 
the Dalai Lama, with their moment of diplomatic contact 
punctuated by the offering of a khatak. Bell watched out 
for the hierarchical markers that would denote his status, 
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recording in his notebook his seating position compared to 
that of other representatives including those from Nepal, 
Kashmir, Bhutan, and Ladakh. Bell, in his losar notes, also 
documented that it was the ranking Tibetan officials from 
high to low who offered their khatak to the Dalai Lama 
first. Only when all the Tibetans had made their presen-
tation were the foreign representatives allowed to make 
their khatak presentation, and unlike in Darjeeling, when 
the Dalai Lama had offered and received the khatak from 
Bell with his own hands, there would be no such material 
contact between the two men now that the site had shifted 
to Lhasa.40 Instead, in this context, Bell had been instruct-
ed to make a deep bow and present his khatak meant for 
the Dalai Lama into the hands of the Chikhyap Khenpo (spyi 
khyab mkhan po)—the highest monk official in the Lhasa 
government. Bell and by extension the British were no 
longer the dominant power here and they were in fact 
not even classed as equals. Like the Dalai Lama had been 
in 1910, they were beyond the borders of their powerbase 
and as a religious force in the long-standing familial, com-
mercial, and diplomatic ties that existed between Lhasa, 
several Himalayan states, and the wider Tibetan Buddhist 
communities of Asia, the British were of little conse-
quence. Yet, Bell’s sense of being ‘Tibetanised’ meant that 
he had shown a willingness to work within the parameters 
of Tibetan khatak hierarchies and this apparently did not 
go unnoticed by the Dalai Lama. After the ceremony, Bell 
was told by one of his closest Tibetan confidants, Palhase 
(pha lha’i sras) (c.1870-c.1936) that the Dalai Lama had 
offered a gesture that Bell had not registered; he had held 
out his upturned palms as he received the khatak from 
the Chikhyap Khenpo. An honor, Bell learned, that was only 
given to one other foreign dignitary—the Chinese amban.41 
This from the British perspective must have been some-
thing of a dubious honor indeed. 
Wrapping Up the Khatak
So ubiquitous is the khatak in trans-Himalayan culture 
it is easy to presume one knows what it means. In these 
geographical, cultural, and diplomatic borderlands we see 
that meanings became fuzzy and difficult to translate. In 
its negotiation, recorded in colonial files, gestures, and the 
actual materiality of the khatak itself, it is possible to see 
how these meanings were made, and how a scarf was used 
to make and project both colonial and Tibetan knowledge 
and prestige. 
These were moments of acute anxiety for the British India 
government, who tethered themselves and found imperial 
comfort in a framework of precedents, developed for the 
most part in the plains of India. When the British had to 
move away from these heartlands, a shakiness soon ap-
peared in their decision-making processes and it is all too 
clear that Tibetan things could divide colonial opinion. The 
response to the khatak was anything but unanimous and 
was instead filled with uncertainties in the metropoles, 
with culture contact responses immediately challenged by 
those who understood the workings of Himalayan net-
works and alliances. There was nothing monolithic about 
colonial knowledge-making here; multiple forms of knowl-
edge produced in different colonial spaces informed it. In 
Lhasa, the British had finally seen how they too were un-
derstood as a useful, if peripheral government on the edge 
of Tibet’s diplomatic and religious world. In this context, 
a British official was not, and never had been, of sufficient 
standing to place a khatak into the hands of Tibet’s leading 
lamas when they resided in their seat of power.
Finally, more than a century ago, the British set a prece-
dent that the international community still follows today. 
Accordingly, the Dalai Lama’s visits to state leaders are 
still judged to be private with his status always open to 
question and interpretation – and, for the most part, 
formulated in the light of Chinese sensibilities, actions, or 
possible reactions. In this meeting in March 1910, we see 
a diplomatic imagining of Tibet and the Dalai Lama that 
even today continues both in turn to include and exclude 
Tibetans from discussions with the world’s heads of state 
and religious figureheads. 
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dus dran yod do cog la phan tshun ’tshams ’dri byed pa 
sogs kyi skabs so sor ’bul skyes dngos spom che chung la 
ma ltos par phan tshun mdza’ brtse’i ’brel ba’i sne ’dogs 
pa’i tshul du kha btags sam/ dar dkar zhig med na mi rung 
ba’i dam rdzas khyad par can zhig chags bsdad yod pa ’di ni 
gna’ snga mo nyid nas dar ba zhig yin/
16. kha btags kyi rim pa ni/ nang mdzod/ a she sog skad 
’dra/ zub she rim pa gsum/ nang mdzod ni/ snga mo 
mdzad sgo gal chen la yar ’bul ba dang / bka’ blon gsar pa/ 
bla chen khri ston sogs la byed spyod byed pa/ a she de 
mang che bas bed spyod byed/ zub she g.yogs sa de dma’ 
rim la yin/
17. deng sang/ kha btags g.yogs dus ske la g.yog nas mna’ 
ma mag pa kha btags kyi ’og tu dbugs bsub ma thebs tsam 
byed pa de dgod re bro/
18. kha btags ’phul stangs la/ yar langs yod na/ pha ma 
dang bla ma’i phyag la ’bul/ de min gsol lcog gi steng du 
phul/ spun chung bas che ba’i lag tu phul/ pha mas bu la 
de bzhin byed/ grogs po phan tshun lag steng du sprod pa 
ma gtogs rke la mi g.yog pa gus zhabs yin/
19. NAI, FD, Secret External, March 1910. Nos. 385-510 Part A.
20. NAI, FD, Secret External, March 1910. Nos. 385-510 
Part A. Butler, 24 February 1910. Butler’s short report to 
the Viceroy is divided into separate Himalayan areas (i.e. 
Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Assam Frontier) each focusing 
on the impact the Dalai Lama’s arrival will have on 
Britain’s relation with said area.
21. The Panchen Lama had been courted by the British as a 
potential ruler of an independent Tsang or southern Tibet 
(gtsang). The British believed they could secure diplomatic 
and trading relations with the lama, someone who they 
saw as an alternative figurehead to the Dalai Lama. The 
British needed an alternative as the Dalai Lama had fled 
Lhasa rather than meet Younghusband in 1904.
22. NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. Nos. 26-31. Visit 
to Calcutta of His Holiness The Dalai Lama in March 1910. 
Ceremonies Observed on the Occasion. Butler to Duke 
(Chief Secretary to the Governor of Bengal). 22 February 
1910.
23. In particular, the Darjeeling Police Inspector Sonam 
Wangfel Laden La (1876-1936) would be responsible not 
only for the saffron colored bed linen and flowers, but 
he would also guide British officers in the nuances of 
diplomatic gift giving. See Martin (2014 and 2015).
24. Edward Henry Scamander Clarke (1856-1947), a senior 
Foreign Department official would say of the offering of 
a salute, “I do not think a salute should be fired. A salute 
establishes the difference between a private and official 
visit.” NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. Nos. 1-22. Part B. 
26 February 1910.
25. NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. Nos. 1-22. Part B. 
Bell, 6 March 1910.
26. NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. Nos. 26-31. Butler 
to Viceroy, 9 March 1910
27. NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. Nos. 26-31. Bell to 
Jelf, 12 March 1909 [sic].
28. NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. Nos. 26-31. Jelf & 
Butler to A. F. Pinhey & V. R. Brooke [Military Secretary to 
the Viceroy], 12 March 1910.
29. A Sikkim delegation headed by Sidkeong Tulku also 
came to Calcutta and stayed at Hastings House as part of 
the Dalai Lama’s wider delegation.
30. Sidkeong Tulku was a ‘first class’ member of the Dalai 
Lama’s party and therefore part of the Dalai Lama’s inner 
circle in Calcutta. NAI, FD, Internal, May 1910. Nos. 23-34. 
Part B.
31. NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. Nos. 26-31. Bell to 
Jelf, 12 March 1909 [sic].
32. After Jelf’s intervention the Viceroy would travel to 
Hasting House, but Butler would make the presentation on 
the Viceroy’s behalf. NAI, FD, Secret Internal, May 1910. 
Nos. 26-31.
33. Jelf would describe the khatak in his briefing notes as, 
“not a nazar but a visiting card.” NAI, FD, Secret Internal, 
May 1910. Nos. 26-31. 
34. Unfortunately, neither do Tibetan texts. The compiler 
of the thirteenth Dalai Lama’s biography, the fourth 
Purchok, Tupten Jampa Tsültrim Tenzin (phur lcog thub 
bstan byams pa tshul khrims bstan ’dzin) (dates unknown) 
was not a historian, but a religious scholar and it seems 
that critical pieces of archival material were not used or 
collated when he compiled and then published the Dalai 
Lama’s biography some seven years after his death in 1940. 
Several years or periods have information that seem to 
be little more than vague memories of events, while for 
several years the entries simply state that the relevant 
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documents and diaries could not be located. All of these 
factors combined with the chaos of exile ensured that 
scant information is now available for critical moments of 
Anglo-Tibetan contact that the Dalai Lama was party to.
35. The full record of this visit is as follows: “He traveled 
to the place, currently known to the people as Calcutta, 
where he met and exchanged greetings with Mulula (Lord 
Minto), the British Regent. He visited factories and zoos 
where animals are kept. He remained for seven days by 
engaging in activities of great benefits”. (deng sang yul 
skad la ka le ka tar grags pa der phyag phebs te dbyin ji’i 
rgyal tshab mu lu la la mtshams zhu dang mjal ’phrad 
mdzad/ ’phrul bzo dang/ spyan gzigs ri dwags sna tshogs 
yod pa rnams la spyan ras kyis btsa’ ba dang/ rang gzhan la 
phan pa’i don rlabs po che mdzad cing zhag bdun bzhugs/). 
(phur lcog thub bstan byams pa tshul khrims bstan ’dzin, 
2010: 150).
36. deng sang yul skad la ka le ka tar grags pa der phyag 
phebs te dbyin ji’i rgyal tshab mu lu la la mtshams zhu 
dang mjal ’phrad mdzad/
37. In many respects David Macdonald’s published works 
are a rewriting of colonial history making. Macdonald, 
critical to the knowledge produced on Tibet in the north-
eastern Himalaya in the early twentieth century, was 
often written out of this process by the colonial officers he 
worked with. While he received some recognition for his 
scholarly knowledge many others did not credit him. See 
my forthcoming article, Knowing Tibet in the Borderlands: 
the Knowledge Making Networks of Himalayan Hill 
Stations. I would suggest that by highlighting the type 
of khatak he received during this exchange he was 
highlighting the elevated position he perceived the Dalai 
Lama to hold him in. 
38. Bell would instruct Tibetans to refer to him as Lönchen 
or Chief Minister (blon chen), the highest civil position in 
Tibetan lay society. In British India however, the post of 
Political Officer Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet was classed as a 
‘second class resident’ in the British India hierarchy (Coen, 
1971: 248). 
39. The Dalai Lama had returned to Tibet in 1912 following 
the collapse of the Qing empire and the removal of Chinese 
troops from central Tibet. Back in Lhasa in February 
1913, he issued what is regarded as a declaration of 
independence (Shakabpa 1967: 246).
40. Only the Kalon Tripa or Prime Minister (bka’ blon khri 
pa) was allowed to offer a khatak directly to the Dalai Lama 
in this context.
41. “It was generally noticed that when I presented 
my Khata [sic] to the Chikyab Kempo for the D.[alai] 
L.[ama] the latter put his two palms forward towards me, 
an honour which he shows to nobody but the Chinese 
Amban.” Private Collection, Charles Bell, Diary Volume 
VIII, pp.84-85.
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